You are currently viewing ISO 27001 From Scratch Part 2: Risk Assessment That Auditors Accept

ISO 27001 From Scratch Part 2: Risk Assessment That Auditors Accept

📋 Key Takeaways
  • Clause 6.1.2 is short, which is why people underestimate it.
  • Use a 5×5 matrix. Five-point scales are granular enough to be meaningful and coarse enough that two people can actually agree on a score.
  • Your register is the centerpiece evidence.
  • Clause 6.1.2 e) requires you to pick from four options for each risk.
8 min read · 1,583 words
Educational & Ethical Use Only — This article is provided for educational and ethical cybersecurity research purposes only. The techniques described should only be used on systems you own or have explicit permission to test. Always follow responsible disclosure and the laws applicable to you. Mitigations are included so engineers can harden real systems.
Concept flowThe ISO 27001 Risk Assessment Flow
  1. 1📋Asset InventoryList assets with owners and value; document what Very High meansValue each asset
  2. 2⚖️Likelihood × ImpactScore each risk on a 5×5 matrix with written scale definitionsLog scores
  3. 3🗃️Risk RegisterRecord inherent and residual scores, owners, and evidence linksAssign options
  4. 4🛠️Treatment DecisionChoose mitigate, accept, transfer, or avoid for each riskTrack over time
  5. 5🔁Re-evaluate ResidualPeriodically re-score residual risk so acceptance stays defensib

Auditors fail inconsistent scoring, missing owners, and never re-evaluated residual risk — keep every link documented.

Governance & Compliance

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TL;DR: Clause 6.1.2 of ISO 27001 asks you to define a repeatable risk methodology and actually apply it — auditors fail you when scores are inconsistent, owners are missing, or residual risk is never re-evaluated. This article walks through building an asset-based methodology with likelihood × impact scoring, a defensible risk register with inherent and residual scores, and the four treatment decisions, using the 50-person SaaS company from Part 1 as the worked example.

Authorization note: everything in this article is documentation and spreadsheet work on your own lab machine. If you add the optional scanning steps, run them only against systems you own or have written permission to test.

What Clause 6.1.2 Actually Requires

Clause 6.1.2 is short, which is why people underestimate it. You must:

  • Define and apply a risk assessment process (your methodology).
  • Identify risks to confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.
  • Analyse and evaluate those risks.
  • Determine options for treating them.
  • Keep documented information proving all of the above.

Auditors check three things: is your methodology defined, did you apply it consistently, and does your evidence connect (risk → treatment → control → statement of applicability)? Break any of those links and you get a nonconformity.

Choosing a Methodology: Asset-Based vs Scenario-Based

There are two dominant approaches:

Approach How it works Best for Weakness
Asset-based Inventory assets, assign each a value, enumerate threats to each asset First-time certifications, smaller orgs Can become a checklist that misses novel attack paths
Scenario-based Write risk scenarios (“attacker steals production DB backup from misconfigured S3 bucket”) Mature orgs, threat-modeling cultures Harder to prove completeness; scenarios can be cherry-picked

For a first certification at a 50-person SaaS, go asset-based with scenario overlays: inventory your assets, then for the crown-jewel assets write 2–3 concrete scenarios each. Auditors like this because it’s systematic (asset-based) but not shallow (scenarios show real analysis).

Build the Asset Inventory First

You cannot assess risk to assets you haven’t listed. Keep it simple — for the Part 1 SaaS company:

Asset Type Owner Value
Production PostgreSQL cluster Information + system Head of Engineering Very High (customer data)
SaaS web application Application CTO Very High
AWS account & infrastructure System Platform Lead High
Employee laptops (~50) Hardware IT Manager Medium
Google Workspace (email, docs) SaaS service IT Manager High
Customer credentials in identity provider Information Security Lead Very High
Source code repository Information Head of Engineering High

Document the value scale too — “Very High” must mean something, e.g. “regulatory or contractual breach, existential business impact.”

Optional Lab Step: Inventory from Infrastructure

If your lab mirrors the SaaS environment, pull an asset list from cloud tooling so your inventory isn’t fantasy. For an AWS lab account:

aws ec2 describe-instances 
  --filters "Name=instance-state-name,Values=running" 
  --query 'Reservations[].Instances[].[InstanceId,InstanceType,Tags[?Key==`Name`].Value|[0]]' 
  --output table

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                            DescribeInstances                               |
+---------------------+-------------+----------------------------------------+
|  i-0a1b2c3d4e5f     |  t3.medium  |  prod-app-01                           |
|  i-0f6e5d4c3b2a     |  db.r6g.large |  prod-postgres-01                    |
+---------------------+-------------+----------------------------------------+

Expected output: a table of running instances. Reconcile this against your spreadsheet. Any instance not in the inventory is a finding in itself.

Scoring: Likelihood × Impact with Real Numbers

Use a 5×5 matrix. Five-point scales are granular enough to be meaningful and coarse enough that two people can actually agree on a score. Document the definitions — auditors ask for them.

Likelihood scale

Score Label Definition (write something like this)
1 Rare Less than once per 5 years; would require exceptional circumstances
2 Unlikely Once every 2–5 years; industry reports few comparable incidents
3 Possible Once every 1–2 years; comparable incidents reported in our sector
4 Likely Expected within 12 months; near-misses have occurred internally
5 Almost certain Expected multiple times per year or already occurring

Impact scale

Score Label Definition
1 Negligible No material harm; absorbed in normal operations
2 Minor Limited internal disruption or minor data exposure; no customer impact
3 Moderate Customer-visible outage or limited data exposure; contractual penalties possible
4 Major Sustained outage, reportable breach, regulatory fines, significant churn
5 Severe Existential: loss of major customers, fines threatening viability, breach of all customer data

Risk score = likelihood × impact, mapped to an acceptance band:

Score Rating Required action
15–25 Critical Treat immediately; executive visibility; escalate if not treated in 30 days
8–12 High Treat within 90 days
4–6 Medium Treat within 6 months or formally accept
1–3 Low Monitor; accept by default

Calibration tip: score three risks as a group before going solo. If engineering scores “developer laptop stolen” likelihood 4 and security scores it 2, you have a definition problem, not a judgment problem. Fix the definitions.

The Risk Register That Survives an Audit

Your register is the centerpiece evidence. Minimum required columns:

  • Risk ID — stable identifier (R-001), never reused
  • Description — threat + asset + consequence, in one sentence
  • Asset — ties back to inventory
  • Existing controls — what’s already in place (this justifies residual ≠ inherent)
  • Inherent likelihood, impact, score — before controls
  • Residual likelihood, impact, score — after controls
  • Treatment decision — modify / retain / avoid / share
  • Risk owner — a named person, not a team
  • Appetite decision / review date — when it gets re-evaluated

Inherent vs Residual: The Part Auditors Probe

Inherent risk assumes no controls. Residual risk is what remains after your existing controls. The gap between them is your justification for the controls you’ve implemented. Common audit failures:

  • Inherent = residual on every row. This implies your controls do nothing, or you never assessed inherent risk. Both are findings.
  • Residual always lands in the green zone. Suspiciously convenient. Have honest residuals — a Critical inherent risk can legitimately remain High after treatment.
  • No mapping from residual risk to Annex A controls. If residual risk is 9 (High) and you chose “modify,” the register must point to the Annex A controls (e.g., A.8.24 cryptography, A.8.7 malware protection) that reduce it, which then appear in your Statement of Applicability.

Tie It Together: Risk → SoA Traceability

Give each register row a “linked Annex A controls” column. When the auditor picks R-003 and asks “why is A.8.24 in your SoA?”, the answer is on one line. Keep this in a simple spreadsheet or GRC tool — a CSV in version control is fine and auditable:

id,asset,description,inherent_l,inherent_i,inherent_score,existing_controls,residual_l,residual_i,residual_score,treatment,owner,annex_a_controls,review_date
R-001,prod-postgres,Customer PII exfiltration via stolen DB credentials,4,5,20,IAM MFA; encryption at rest; secret rotation,2,5,10,modify,head-eng,A.8.2 A.8.24 A.8.28,2026-06-30
R-002,laptops,Malware on unmanaged laptop spreads to internal systems,3,4,12,MDM; EDR; automatic patching,2,3,6,modify,it-mgr,A.8.7 A.8.8 A.8.16,2026-09-30
R-003,aws-infra,Public S3 bucket exposes customer backups,3,5,15,Block Public Access org policy; config scanning,1,5,5,modify,platform-lead,A.8.9 A.8.16,2026-06-30

Worked Example: Full Register for the 50-Person SaaS

Here’s the complete register for the Part 1 company. Note how inherent scores are high, existing controls drive residuals down, and one risk is accepted:

ID Risk Inherent L×I Existing controls Residual L×I Treatment Owner Review
R-001 Customer PII exfiltrated via stolen DB credentials 4×5=20 Critical MFA on AWS IAM, encryption at rest, secret rotation every 90 days 2×5=10 High Modify — add DB activity monitoring (A.8.16) Head of Engineering 2026-06-30
R-002 Ransomware on unmanaged laptop spreads laterally 3×4=12 High Kandji MDM, Defender EDR, auto-patching, disk encryption 2×3=6 Medium Modify — quarterly phishing simulation (A.6.8) IT Manager 2026-09-30
R-003 Misconfigured S3 bucket exposes customer backups publicly 3×5=15 Critical Org-wide Block Public Access, nightly config compliance scan 1×5=5 Medium Modify — alert on any config drift within 1h (A.8.16) Platform Lead 2026-06-30
R-004 Extended AWS region outage makes SaaS unavailable >24h 2×4=8 High Multi-AZ deployment, daily tested backups 2×3=6 Medium Retain — multi-region cost not justified at current ARR; documented in management review CTO 2026-03-31
R-005 Departing engineer retains access to production 4×4=16 Critical SSO with Google Workspace, offboarding checklist, quarterly access review 2×4=8 High Modify — automate deprovisioning via SCIM within 4h (A.5.18) Security Lead 2026-06-30
R-006 Vendor payroll SaaS suffers breach leaking employee PII 2×2=4 Medium Vendor review at onboarding, minimal data shared 2×2=4 Medium Retain — within appetite; monitored IT Manager 2026-12-31

The Four Treatment Decisions and When Each Is Defensible

Clause 6.1.2 e) requires you to pick from four options for each risk. Getting the vocabulary right matters — auditors specifically check that you don’t just “modify” everything.

1. Modify (mitigate)

Apply controls to reduce likelihood or impact. Defensible when the residual score is above appetite and a cost-effective control exists. This should be your most common decision — typically 70–80% of rows. Always name the control and a target date.

2. Retain (accept)

Decide the residual risk is within appetite and do nothing further. Defensible when: the residual score falls in your accepted band, the cost of treatment exceeds the benefit, and — critically — the acceptance is documented and signed by the risk owner. “We accept everything green by default” is fine if your methodology says so; a silent acceptance of a High risk is a finding. Revisit accepted risks at the review date or when context changes.

3. Avoid (terminate)

Stop the activity that creates the risk. Defensible when the activity isn’t core to the business. Real examples: decommissioning a legacy admin portal nobody uses, dropping a data-sharing integration that can’t meet contractual security terms. If avoiding the risk would mean shutting down your core product, this isn’t avoidance — it’s fantasy. Auditors have seen it.

4. Share (transfer)

Shift some of the financial or operational burden to a third party. Defensible when it genuinely reduces exposure: cyber insurance for financial impact, contractual liability clauses with vendors, or moving from self-hosted Postgres to a managed database service. Not defensible as: a way to make risk disappear. You can outsource the infrastructure, but not accountability to your customers or the regulator. If R-004 were “shared” with a cloud provider’s SLA, you’d still own the customer-facing availability risk.

Proving Your Methodology Is Applied, Not Just Written

Small habits that make the difference between “documented” and “lived”:

  • Consistent scoring. Same threat scenario scored by two people should land within one point. Record who scored each risk.
  • Living review dates. Auditors sample rows and
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    Check your understanding

    1. Why does the article recommend combining an asset-based methodology with scenario overlays for a first-time certification?

    2. According to the article, what is the main reason auditors issue nonconformities in risk assessments?

    3. What does the article say the value scale in the asset inventory must include?

    4. Why does the article advocate likelihood × impact scoring on 5-point scales rather than finer scales?

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Prabhu Kalyan Samal

Application Security Consultant and founder of Hmmnm. Certified Red Team Operator, Burp Suite Certified Practitioner, eWPTX, CompTIA SecurityX and Azure Security Engineer. Writes hands-on labs and threat analysis on web, cloud and AI-agent security.