The XZ Utils Backdoor: Inside the Almost-Catastrophe

The most patient supply-chain attack ever caught — a two-year maintainer infiltration that planted an SSH backdoor into xz-utils release tarballs, discovered in March 2024 only because one engineer noticed 500 milliseconds of latency. This account traces the Jia Tan persona from helpful contributor to release engineer, the test-file obfuscation and build-stage injection, the systemd/sshd target chain, the near-miss that kept stable distros clean, and the trust-model reforms that rippled through open source.

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JetBrains TeamCity Auth Bypass: Build Servers as Front Door

March 2024’s CVE-2024-27198 let unauthenticated attackers mint admin accounts on self-hosted TeamCity CI servers, converting every connected build agent into attacker-controlled execution holding source, secrets and signing keys. This piece covers the alternate-path authentication bypass, the companion path traversal, the ransomware crews that queued within days, and the year’s hard-learned rule that build infrastructure deserves domain-controller-grade security.

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AnyDesk Breach: Production Compromise and a Certificate Sprint

Remote-access maker AnyDesk confirmed in February 2024 that attackers had compromised production systems using valid credentials traced to infostealer logs — forcing a certificate rotation, password resets, and a rushed 8.1.1 release whose code-signing was intact but whose credibility needed rebuilding. This piece covers the infostealer-to-supply-chain escalation path that rewired vendor-risk thinking, and why remote-admin tooling became a tier-one identity perimeter.

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DP World Australia: When a Cyber Incident Stopped the Cranes

On 13 November 2023, DP World Australia disconnected its port systems from the internet to contain an intrusion — and container operations at Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Fremantle stopped cold, stranding roughly 30,000 containers for three days. Operations resumed by 16 November, personnel data exposure was later confirmed, and no ransom payment was disclosed. The episode became Australia’s reference case for cyber-driven supply-chain disruption and a model of disciplined containment, rapid restoration and honest capacity communication under SOI-Act scrutiny.

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AST09 & AST10: Governance and Cross-Platform Reuse

The finale of our OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 series. AST09: one-line skill installs that no inventory, IAM system, or SOC ever sees — 800+ malicious skills circulating, 83% of organizations deploying agentic AI, 29% ready. AST10: porting skills across platforms silently drops manifests, permissions, and risk tiers. With the Bilateral Receipt Pattern, EU AI Act Article 12, and the Universal Skill Format proposal.

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Read more about the article AST07 & AST08: Update Drift and Weak Scanning
OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 series cover (cover_p7.png)

AST07 & AST08: Update Drift and Weak Scanning

The two post-deployment risks in the OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10: AST07 malicious updates riding channels with no signatures, pinning or freeze mode (40,000 exposed instances in 24 hours), and AST08 scanners that structurally lag base64, zero-width, pure-natural-language and .pyc evasion. Digest pinning, PASS/FAIL/INCOMPLETE pipelines, and Unicode strip ranges — dissected.

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Read more about the article The Pipeline Is the Attack: AST02 Skill Supply Chain Compromise, Explained
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The Pipeline Is the Attack: AST02 Skill Supply Chain Compromise, Explained

AST02 of the OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 maps attacks on the skill distribution layer: registry flooding, dependency confusion, config files that execute on clone (CVE-2025-59536, CVE-2026-21852), and maintainer takeover. With Trail of Bits' evidence that every marketplace scanner can be bypassed.

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Read more about the article AST01: Malicious Agent Skills (ClawHavoc Case Study)
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AST01: Malicious Agent Skills (ClawHavoc Case Study)

AST01 of the OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 dissected: how ClawHavoc shipped 1,184 malicious skills from 12 accounts, why five of ClawHub's top seven downloads were malware, and how three lines of markdown exfiltrated SSH keys - with the full attack playbook and controls.

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Read more about the article Agent Skills Are the New npm: OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 Explained
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Agent Skills Are the New npm: OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 Explained

The OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 maps the 10 risks of the AI-agent skill ecosystem - malicious skills, supply chain compromise, over-privileged manifests, metadata attacks, weak isolation, update drift, scanning gaps, governance failures and cross-platform reuse - with real 2026 evidence.

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Read more about the article Marquis Data Breach: One SonicWall Firewall, 74 Banks, 672,075 Identities
Marquis breach anatomy – one cracked firewall rippling across 74 banks

Marquis Data Breach: One SonicWall Firewall, 74 Banks, 672,075 Identities

Attackers entered Texas fintech Marquis through a SonicWall firewall and reached data for 700+ client banks - 672,075 identities, 74 institutions disrupted. The supply-chain anatomy and five break-points.

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