Threat Modeling
Find the flaws while they are still cheap — on the whiteboard, before they ship to production.
What we cover
- Application and infrastructure threat-modeling workshops
- Attack-surface and trust-boundary mapping (data-flow diagrams)
- STRIDE analysis per element and attack trees on crown jewels
- AI and agent threat modeling — new trust boundaries, new abuse cases
- Cloud, CI/CD, and supply-chain pipeline threat models
- Prioritized mitigations with risk and effort context
How we test
We map the system: components, data flows, and — most importantly — where trust changes hands. The diagram alone regularly reveals flaws.
Structured analysis against each element (STRIDE) plus attack trees on the assets that matter most.
Findings ranked by risk and implementation effort — so the roadmap is obvious, not aspirational.
The model stays a living document, reviewed at design time for every significant change. Your team learns to run the next one.
What you get
- A living threat-model document with diagrams
- Trust-boundary map of your system
- Prioritized, effort-aware mitigation backlog
- A workshop so your team can repeat the process
The engagement at a glance
A short conversation about your environment. You receive a written scope, timeline, and fixed quote — no obligation.
Testing begins only with your written permission and agreed rules of engagement. Always.
A calendar agreed before we start, with an agreed communication plan while testing runs.
A verification pass over everything you fix — included in the price, not an add-on.
See the full engagement process → and how pricing is scoped in our public pricing guide.
Related research from Hmmnm
Common questions
When should we threat model?
Ideally at design time — new system, new feature, or major change, when fixes cost a marker stroke. Retroactive modeling of a running system is also valuable and often reveals inherited assumptions nobody remembers justifying.
Which methodology do you use?
A pragmatic mix: data-flow diagrams with explicit trust boundaries, STRIDE per element, and attack trees for crown jewels. For AI systems we add agent-specific abuse cases mapped to MITRE ATLAS and the OWASP Agentic AI Top 10.
Is this a one-time exercise?
The model is per system, but the value compounds when it is kept alive — reviewed at each significant design change. We set it up so your team can run those refreshes themselves.
Do you need access to our code?
No — architecture diagrams, design documents, and a working session with your engineers are enough. Code access deepens it, but the method works at design level.
Want this assessed for your environment?
A short scoping conversation is enough to get a fixed quote. No obligation — a researcher replies.
Start the conversation →