Heroku Held the Keys: Anatomy of a Vendor-Token Breach
GitHub’s OAuth tokens lived in Heroku’s infrastructure. One compromised CI cache later, an ecosystem learned where vendor tokens really live.
GitHub’s OAuth tokens lived in Heroku’s infrastructure. One compromised CI cache later, an ecosystem learned where vendor tokens really live.
Attackers stole GitHub integration tokens from Heroku and Travis CI, pivoted into npm, and downloaded ~109,000 publishing credentials.
37GB claimed, one account compromised, no customer data lost — and a DEV-0536 profile that taught the industry how social engineering beats MFA.
One contractor’s stolen credentials reached super-admin support tooling across 366 Okta tenants. The identity supply chain’s hardest lesson.
One contractor’s credentials, 190 GB of Galaxy bootloader and biometrics code, and the pure steal-and-dump model that outlived encryption ransomware.
No zero-days, no malware — just MFA fatigue, SIM swaps, and help-desk social engineering. How Lapsus$ broke every assumption.
Two months of undetected access to managed WordPress hosting, wholesale sFTP and database credential harvesting, and SSL keys in the bargain.
Popular packages with dormant maintainers pushed info-stealers through postinstall scripts. The registry was fine; the accounts were not.
REvil turned Kaseya’s remote-management platform into a mass-encryption weapon, hitting ~60 MSPs and up to 1,500 downstream businesses days before a patch could land.
780 GB of Frostbite engine and FIFA code left EA through a purchased Slack cookie and one help-desk MFA reset. The breach that proved sessions, not passwords, are the modern front door.
A tampered Codecov Bash Uploader quietly shipped CI environment variables — cloud keys, tokens, signing material — to attackers for two months. The curl-pipe-bash trust model dissected, and how build supply-chain security was rewritten after.
No exploits, no stolen credentials — Alex Birsan’s February 2021 research got code executed inside 35+ major companies by registering their internal package names on public registries and letting version arithmetic do the rest. The incident file on the cheapest supply-chain attack ever demonstrated.